Butler University

Digital Commons @ Butler University
Scholarship and Professional Work - LAS

College of Liberal Arts & Sciences

11-21-2005

Livestock, Liberalization, and Democracy: Constraints and
Opportunities for Rural Livestock Producers in Reforming Uganda
Robin L. Turner
Butler University, rltunre1@butler.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.butler.edu/facsch_papers
Part of the Policy Design, Analysis, and Evaluation Commons, and the Political Science Commons

Recommended Citation
Turner, R.L. Livestock, Liberalization, and Democracy: Constraints and Opportunities for Rural Livestock
Producers in Reforming Uganda. Pro-poor Livestock Policy Initiative Working Paper No. 29 and Policy
Brief. Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 2005. Available from:
digitalcommons.butler.edu/facsch_papers/476/

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Liberal Arts & Sciences at Digital
Commons @ Butler University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Scholarship and Professional Work - LAS by an
authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Butler University. For more information, please contact
digitalscholarship@butler.edu.

Pro-Poor
Livestock
Policy
Initiative

Livestock, Liberalization and Democracy:
Constraints and Opportunities for Rural
Livestock Producers in a Reforming Uganda
Robin L. Turner
Research Director: David K. Leonard
University of California, Berkeley

A Living from

Livestock

PPLPI Working Paper No. 29

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Preface................................................................................................................ ii
Abbreviations ....................................................................................................... iii
Executive summary .................................................................................................iv
Introduction .......................................................................................................... 1
Section I: Livestock production, processing, and marketing in Uganda .................................... 2
Livestock Production ............................................................................................ 2
Livestock Marketing and Processing ........................................................................... 3
Animal Disease and Health Service Provision ................................................................ 4
Domestic and International Markets for Ugandan Livestock Products ................................... 6
Regulation and Enforcement ................................................................................... 7
Section II: National Resistance Movement Governance: Politics in semi-authoritarian Uganda ........ 8
Enduring Conflict in Northern and Eastern Uganda ......................................................... 8
Semi-authoritarian Politics: “No Party Democracy” and Local Governance ...........................10
Section III: Reforming Uganda: neo-liberalism & participation .............................................16
Liberal Reform Alliance ........................................................................................ 16
Changing Governance and Bureaucratic Politics ...........................................................18
Participatory Policy Processes: The Poverty Eradication Action Plan ..................................22
Civil Society Views of Participatory Processes ............................................................. 25
Dairy Sector Reforms: Participation and Exclusion and Privatization Processes ......................26
Conclusion: Opportunities for strategic intervention.........................................................29
Improving Livestock Sector Infrastructure .................................................................. 29
Improving Incentives for Market Participation and Productivity.........................................30
Linking Information to Reform Assessments ................................................................ 31
Supporting Citizen and Civil Society Participation......................................................... 31
References........................................................................................................... 33

i

PREFACE
This is the 29th of a series of Working Papers prepared for the Pro-Poor Livestock
Policy Initiative (PPLPI). The purpose of these papers is to explore issues related to
livestock development in the context of poverty alleviation.
Livestock is vital to the economies of many developing countries. For low income
producers, livestock can serve as a vital source of food, store of wealth, provide
draught power and organic fertiliser for crop production and a means of transport.
Consumption of livestock and livestock products in developing countries, though
starting from a low base, is growing rapidly.
This paper explores the policy environment surrounding livestock policy improvements
in Uganda, with a view to identify opportunities for pro-poor interventions and
reforms. The paper reviews challenges facing livestock producers and analyzes the
broad political economic context in which livestock sector dynamics are situated.
We hope this paper will provide useful information to its readers and any feedback is
welcome by the authors, PPLPI and the Livestock Information, Sector Analysis and
Policy Branch (AGAL) of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO).

Disclaimer
The designations employed and the presentation of material in this publication do not
imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Food and
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any
country, territory, city or area or its authorities or concerning the delimitations of its
frontiers or boundaries. The opinions expressed are solely those of the author(s) and
do not constitute in any way the official position of the FAO.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This paper explores the policy environment surrounding livestock policy improvements
in Uganda, a country that has undergone substantial reforms in the last 15 years. It
aims to identify opportunities for pro-poor interventions—reforms that would improve
the livelihoods of poor rural livestock producers. Towards this end, the paper reviews
challenges facing for livestock producers and analyzes the broad political economic
context in which livestock sector dynamics are situated.
The adoption and
implementation of pro-poor livestock sector interventions are in some ways
constrained and, in others, enabled by civil conflict in several parts of the country,
the semi-authoritarian nature of the Museveni regime, and the reform alliance
between the Ugandan national government and its international development
partners.
Ugandans face an uneasy trade-off between political stability and
democracy that inhibits participation.
A review of the livestock sector highlights the constraints facing poor rural livestock
producers. Livestock production contributes to rural livelihoods by serving as a source
of food, a store of wealth, and a source of cash.
Missing or inadequate
infrastructure—such as roads, electricity, weighing stations and cattle dips— serves as
a serious constraint to the marketing of livestock. Inadequate infrastructure raises
transaction costs, exacerbates information asymmetries between producers and
traders, and discourages investment in processing. Although the government has
begun rebuilding the infrastructure destroyed during the civil conflicts, much of the
responsibility for animal health services provision and marketing infrastructure has
been devolved to local governments that have not prioritized the livestock sector.
Policymakers and livestock producers are also challenged by the small size of the
domestic market and limited capacity to service international markets.
Livestock producers are situated in a complex political environment. Many residents
of northern and eastern Uganda continue to suffer from violent conflict between the
Lord's Resistance Army, the government, and civilians or from predation by cattle
rustlers. These conflicts have devastating humanitarian costs, they divert resources
toward security and away from investment in livestock and other areas, and they
reinforce the influence of the security apparatus relative to elected officials and civil
servants.
In stable regions, Ugandans encounter the semi-authoritarian political regime
established by Museveni’s National Resistance Movement (NRM).
This regime
combines elections and other opportunities for citizens to influence public policy with
restrictions on political participation and occasional violations of citizens’ civil
liberties, sending mixed signals to citizens. The “Movement” political system allowed
individuals to contest elections but prohibited political parties from engaging in core
activities such as preparing platforms, holding regular meetings, and opening branch
offices. The Ugandan government also has implemented decentralization measures
ostensibly intended to bring government closer to the people. Local governments
enjoy substantial authority, and many village councils enjoy popular support.
However, much of the decision-making authority is concentrated at the more difficultto-access district level where officials often operate in a corrupt or clientelistic
manner. In this environment, most citizens will not fully exploit existing opportunities
to participate.
Since 1986, the NRM government has implemented major liberalizing economic
reforms that seek to alter the state’s basic approach to the market and service
provision. These reforms have been pushed by an alliance of major multilateral and
bilateral donors and reformers within government who worked together on an ongoing
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basis. Although neoliberal reform rhetoric pervades policy discourse, many civil
servants are sceptical about this approach. Although donors have sought to work
around resistance by creating new, reform-supportive agencies, the cases of the
National Agricultural Advisory Services and the African Development Bank Livestock
Sector Development Program loan show that it is difficult for reforms to succeed
without allies within more established agencies.
The donor-government reform alliance also has focused attention on poverty, and the
government has institutionalized processes through which associations, organizations
and local governments can participate in policy formulation. The Poverty Eradication
Action Plan (PEAP) is the Uganda’s central policy document on poverty and
development, and it is now revised through a participatory process. During the most
recent revision, pastoralism-supportive organizations engaged in a concerted effort to
alter the way in which the PEAP addresses pastoralism and pastoralist issues with
some success. While the Poverty Eradication Action Plan revision process highlights
the potential for propoor reforms within a liberal paradigm, the privatization of the
parastatal Dairy Corporation highlights the limits of reform.
Although the
privatization of the Dairy Corporation directly affected thousands of livestock
producers, producers and potential buyers were largely excluded from the decisionmaking process until a series of newspaper articles revealed irregular actions by
members of the Cabinet and the President. Eventually, it was announced that the
corporation would be sold to dairy farmers. In this case, the media played a crucial
role in opening up processes for review.
The concluding section outlines several interventions that could improve the
livelihoods of poor rural livestock producers in Uganda. Working within the dominant
neoliberal reform context, the proposed interventions seek to reduce barriers to
producer benefit and improve the functioning of livestock markets. In particular,
information provision, investment in infrastructure, and development of measurable
indicators of how reforms affect poor Ugandans could have substantial impact.
Proposed interventions include:

!
!
!
!

Facilitating provision and maintenance of livestock-specific infrastructure
Disseminating livestock market information to livestock producers
Eliminating or reducing fees on the sale or slaughter of livestock
Establishing standards or branding mechanisms to identify high quality livestock
products

! Incorporating indicators of poor people and pastoralists’ participation and benefit
into the assessment of government supported programs; and

! Building the capacity of membership associations to participate in policy processes.
The proposed interventions would increase livestock producers’ capacity to engage
with the market and with the state. The interventions discussed above would not
alter the fundamental political context of semi-authoritarian governance and enduring
violent conflict in much of the country. Ugandans will decide how to address these
problems through their individual and collective actions over the long-term.

v

INTRODUCTION
This paper explores the policy environment surrounding livestock policy improvements
in Uganda, a country that has undergone substantial reforms in the last 15 years. Its
aim is to identify opportunities for pro-poor interventions—reforms that would
improve the livelihoods of poor rural livestock producers. To do so, one must situate
livestock sector dynamics in the broader political economic environment. The
adoption and implementation of pro-poor livestock sector interventions are in some
ways constrained and, in others, enabled by the semi-authoritarian nature of the
Museveni regime, the unresolved conflict in northern and eastern Uganda, and the
reform alliance between the Ugandan national government and its international
development partners. There is space for pro-poor interventions in this context – in
particular, information provision, investment in infrastructure, and development of
measurable indicators for poverty impact could have substantial positive impact —but
poor producers will remain vulnerable as long as Ugandans face an uneasy trade-off
between stability and democracy. While these structural problems cannot be easily
resolved, particularly by outsiders, livestock sector interventions should take these
factors into account.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 1 provides an overview of the livestock
sector, highlighting the production and marketing processes. This section also
identifies several challenges which livestock sector participants face. Section 2
describes and analyzes Uganda's political environments, discussing the political
regime, the civil conflicts, and local governance. This section highlights the
contradictions between the real opportunities for participation and accountability,
continued reliance on patronage, and the semi-authoritarian nature of the political
regime. Section 3 discusses the dynamics of Uganda’s economic and participatory
reforms. Reform processes have been shaped by an alliance between reformers within
government and Uganda’s major development partners. While alliance partners have
made neo-liberal governance the dominant discourse and policy approach, civil
servants with different perspectives have used a variety of tactics to work around the
framework as illustrated by the case of the African Development Bank Livestock
Productivity Improvement Project. The Poverty Eradication Action Plan shows how
reforms have prioritized poverty and increased openness to civil society while the
privatization of the Dairy Corporation highlights the limitations of participatory
reforms.
The final section identifies several options for strategic pro-poor
interventions in the livestock sector.
This paper is based on research conducted in Uganda in October and November of
2004. Interviews were conducted with leaders of farmers associations and other
livestock sector membership groups, officials from government ministries and
parastatal organizations, staff of Ugandan and international civil society
organizations, individuals from multilateral and bilateral donor agencies, and
researchers.1 The paper also draws from scholarly publications, reports produced by
nongovernmental organisations (NGOs), and the Ugandan English-language media.

1

All quotations are taken from the author’s interviews unless an alternate citation is provided. Short quotations are marked
by quotation marks “”; longer quotations are indented. To protect respondents’ confidentiality, most quotations do not
identify individuals by name or organization. Identification is provided for public statements and quotations in which the
individual agreed to be identified.
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SECTION I: LIVESTOCK PRODUCTION, PROCESSING, AND MARKETING
IN UGANDA
Uganda is a largely rural and agricultural society. About 88 percent of the population
lives in rural areas (UBOS 2002), and agriculture comprises roughly 45 percent of the
gross domestic product (GDP). Additionally, the agricultural sector employs about 80
percent of the labour force (UBOS 2001). Although crop-based agriculture is dominant
– exports of coffee, cotton, tobacco and tea are the primary sources of export
earnings – livestock production is an important contributor to subsistence livelihoods.
It is estimated that livestock production comprises 7.5 percent of GDP and 17 percent
of Agricultural GDP (Muhereza and Ossiya 2003).2 Although agriculture provides
subsistence and income for many Ugandans, many agriculturalists remain poor.
Ugandans reliant upon crop agriculture are more likely to be poor than those reliant
on other agricultural activities such as livestock and fishing. Slightly more than half of
Ugandans reliant on crops were poor as compared to about a third of those engaged in
noncrop agriculture (Okidi et al. 2004: Table A4).
Livestock production is most important in the “cattle corridor” which ranges from
Ntungamao district in southwestern Uganda to Kotido district in the northeast (See
map on following page). About 60 percent of households in the cattle corridor keep
livestock, and the majority of indigenous cattle are kept in the corridor (NAADS ; King
2002c). Nationally, about 40 percent of rural households own poultry, 20 percent own
cattle, and close to one third have goats (UBOS 2001). For most households, livestock
are not an important source of cash incomes (Ashley and Nanyeenya 2002). Instead,
livestock are important because they serve as a source of food, as a store of wealth (a
bank), and, in the case of cattle, as a status symbol. Livestock accumulation can
enable households to diversify and improve their livelihoods. Cattle also are used to
pay bride price in many communities. These uses of livestock are not recorded in the
GDP figures provided above.

Livestock Production
Livestock production in Uganda is overwhelmingly a small holder and pastoralist
undertaking. Smallholders and pastoralists jointly possess 90 percent of cattle and a
larger proportion of poultry, pigs, sheep and goats (FAO 2004). Most livestock are
raised in one of three broad production systems: mixed crop and livestock production,
pastoral production and commercial ranching. Of these, the mixed systems account
for the majority of livestock. In pastoral production systems, livestock production is
the central component of a livelihood strategy in which producers move with their
livestock in search of water and grazing (See Muhereza 2003; Muhereza and Ossiya
2003). In Uganda, most pastoralist households have a land base; they are not purely
nomadic. Although pastoralism is most common in arid areas of northeastern Uganda,
seasonal movements of cattle occur throughout the corridor. A small proportion of
livestock are raised on commercially oriented ranches; ranches appear to account for
less than 10 percent of the beef and milk reaching the commercial market. Urban and
periurban households are increasingly engaging in livestock keeping (Guendel 2002;
Ishagi et al. 2002). It is estimated that urban and periurban livestock keepers provide
as much as 70 percent of Kampala’s eggs and poultry (Maxwell and Zziwa 1997, cited
in Ishagi et al. 2002). This paper focuses on rural livestock producers as these
continue to constitute the majority; 96 percent of poor Ugandans live in rural areas
(Okidi et al. 2004).

2

The data on livestock production in Uganda is limited, and a livestock census has not been conducted in the last five years.
The estimates in this section are based on available data but should be treated with caution.
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Livestock Marketing and Processing
Rural livestock producers face substantial marketing constraints. Sector participants
identified infrastructure as a crucial constraint. Much of Uganda’s infrastructure,
including roads, market weighing stations, and cattle dips, was destroyed in the
period between 1971 and 1985. Although the state is rebuilding this infrastructure,
transaction costs remain high. It is expensive to move livestock from the rural areas
where they are raised to the towns and urban centers where demand is highest, and
the quality of livestock products often deteriorates during the transit process. Most
producers rely upon informal traders to market their goods.3 Milk traders purchase
milk from farmers or collection centers and then market the milk or sell it to vendors
for transport to urban areas (Kasirye 2003). Livestock traders purchase animals at
farms or local livestock markets and then transport them to abattoirs in urban
centers. One trader described the marketing process as follows:
The cost of the car is an important factor in how profitable the sales are. The
distance to each market varies. Some places are closer, but they are less likely to
have a good supply of cows [for example, Jinga]. A trader might go to Jinga, Mbarara,
or Nakasongolo. They do not know in advance which markets will have good cows, but
usually in the districts where they are good at pastoralism [which are farther away]
they have cows. The traders do not have agents, but go to each market and advance
to the next one if there are not enough animals.

3

There are some milk collection centers and cooperatives through which dairy farmers collectively market milk. See
Kasirye’s (2003) report on the dairy sector and Muhereza’s (2003) discussion of livestock for more extensive analysis of
marketing processes.
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Livestock traders provide an important service. However, the absence of market
infrastructure creates an information asymmetry that disadvantages producers.
Without weighing stations, grading systems, or instruments to test milk quality,
traders and producers rely on their knowledge in reaching a sale price, and traders are
likely to have better information.
The absence of weighing stations makes it easier to cheat the farmers. The traders
have been in this for a long time, and they can look at the animals and know what
they weigh. The farmers don't have the same expertise (Interview).
In October 2001, dry hides weighing between 10-11 kg were bought from small holder
farmers for about Uganda Shillings 10,000 per hide or 1,000 per kg for Grade I and
5,000 per hide or 500 per kg for Grade III (UIA 2003). Exporters were realizing over
shs 6,000 per kg when they sold the hides to export markets, with the average price
per kg being shs 7,320 (Uganda Revenue Authority – Customs – Unpublished data Feb
2001). (From Muhereza and Ossiya 2003: 41)
Pastoralists are particularly vulnerable during drought periods in which they must sell
animals to purchase grain. Pastoralists must move their animals long distances (often
up to 100 kilometers) to market, and the condition of the animals deteriorates during
the journey. Because it is unlikely that the animals would survive a return journey,
pastoralists become “price takers,” they must accept the prices offered even when
they know they are unfair.
Systematic communication of agricultural price
information could address this information asymmetry, but at present the system does
not include livestock products.
Facilities for processing livestock products are also limited. Because there are few
facilities for processing hides or canning meats, meats, hides and skins, horns and
other parts are sold by the abattoirs in relatively raw form (King;, 2002c). Although
there are a dozen milk processing companies, their milk purchases are largely
restricted to the southwest and central region (Kasirye 2003). Lack of processing
facilities increases the seasonal price fluctuations inherent in livestock markets
because it diminishes marketers’ control over when goods enter the market.
Processed products can garner higher prices, and livestock processors, traders and
government officials stated that value addition has economic potential. However,
potential investors indicated that the inconsistency of power provision is a major
disincentive because it increases operating costs and spoilage losses. Although this
problem is not unique to the livestock sector, it has particularly negative effects on
products that require refrigeration.4

Animal Disease and Health Service Provision
Many livestock sector participants indicated that there is a need to improve the
quality of Ugandan livestock. However, widespread animal disease and inadequate
animal health service provision are serious constraints to improving quality. Endemic
and epidemic diseases impose serious costs on livestock producers and reduce the

4

Because there is insufficient power to meet the demand, power companies have been scheduling periodic outages, a
practice locally referred to as “load shedding”. In some areas, load shedding occurs as frequently as every other evening.
Companies experience substantial costs in paying for alternate sources of power or losses due to spoilage.
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incentive to invest in “improved” animals that are more vulnerable to disease.5 An
animal health service official (and trained veterinarian) commented:
The most productive animals cannot survive here because of our endemic diseases.
Yet our indigenous animals are low productivity; their best trait is disease resistance.
For example the pig industry can't develop because of African swine fever. Farmers
can't keep many pigs because of the risk of catastrophic loss. In the poultry industry
we have Newcastle disease.
As with the physical infrastructure, the government network for controlling disease
and providing health services deteriorated substantially during the civil conflicts. At
independence, the government took responsibility for provision of all animal health
services. After the Museveni-led National Resistance Movement took power in 1986,
the government withdrew from provision of clinical health services, which it regarded
as a private good, and devolved other animal health services to local governments
(See Silkin and Kasirye 2002:16-18).
The central government has retained
responsibility for policy, regulation and disease control and surveillance. Central
government disease control has focused on epidemic diseases including rinderpest,
contagious bovine pleuro-pneumonia, foot and mouth disease and rabies. The system
has encountered a number of challenges. Local governments have not prioritized
animal health services and disease surveillance, and central government has found it
difficult to garner the necessary funds to respond to epidemics. At present, it seems
that the majority of veterinarians are employed by local governments to do regulatory
work. These veterinarians also unofficially provide veterinary services on a fee-forservice basis. Animal health service providers have also begun to operate as stockists,
opening small shops that sell drugs and other livestock-related supplies. A small
number of veterinarians, perhaps 80, are fully engaged in private practice.6 Both the
cost of treatment and the location of providers limit disease prevention, treatment
and control. Most formally trained animal health personnel are based in towns, and
road conditions can make it difficult to reach remote producers.7 Despite its
importance, most of the individuals interviewed for this report focused on other
challenges facing the sector such as marketing, processing, and policy reforms. One
respondent commented:
Five years ago if you visited you would have heard lots about disease. It is a shift in
thinking; if you look at the market all else will follow. Can I afford the control regime
for disease? If you pay for the service, the treatment is there. We used to focus on
that - treatment. Now we focus on markets and profitability so that farmers are in a
position to control disease. You figure out where the market is and then think about
prevention and vaccine accessibility. The market would trigger those things.
Marketing challenges are discussed in the following section.

5

“Improved” animals are crossbred or exotic animals with the genetic potential to produce higher volumes of milk or meat
than indigenous “unimproved” animals. The actual performance of improved animals is highly dependent on the inputs
(feed, fodder, water, health services) they receive.
Most publications estimate that 95 percent of the Ugandan livestock population is indigenous, but Staal and Kaguongo
(2003:14-15, Appendix) argue that the proportion of improved cattle is roughly 26 percent. It is likely that a much higher
percentage of zero-grazed dairy animals are improved because the major charitable organizations that donate livestock,
Heifer Project International and Send a Cow, provide improved animals and advocate zero grazing.
6
The European Union funded a Veterinary Privatization Project, which was implemented by the Uganda Veterinary
Association and the Pan African Programme for the Control of Epizootics. About 40 veterinarians have participated in the
program, out of approximately 600 registered veterinarians in Uganda (European Commission 2004).
7

One respondent suggested that a community animal health worker initiative in Karamoja is meeting with some success.
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Domestic and International Markets for Ugandan Livestock Products
When I'm thinking about how and whether to invest, the foreign market is uncertain
and the domestic market is limited. Creating a proper dairy plant is expensive and
you need consistent water, utilities, etc. Right now, we are in a consolidation phase.
A further constraint facing the livestock sector is the small size of the domestic
market. Uganda is a poor country and the purchasing power of most Ugandans is very
limited. Ugandan GDP per capita was US$1,390 (in purchasing power parity) in 2002,
compared to an average of US $1,790 in sub-Saharan African countries (UNDP 2004).
Although food accounts for roughly 60 percent of expenditure in rural households
(UBOS 2001),8 meat and milk consumption is quite low. Low milk consumption may
also be attributed to consumer preferences; Ugandans consume less milk relative to
income than people in neighboring countries (Staal and Kaguongo 2003). Most of the
milk processing facilities operate well below capacity (Kasirye 2003). Additionally,
market purchases of livestock products are limited by widespread household
engagement in small-scale or subsistence agriculture. Ugandans rely heavily upon the
milk and the meat that they produce; a national household survey found that home
produce accounted for about half of rural food consumption (UBOS 2001).9 Given the
many barriers to optimal market functioning – especially high transaction costs and
poor rural financial services—rural producers may be reluctant to take the risk of
shifting towards commercial production.10
Until a greater proportion of rural
Ugandans become integrated into the cash economy, the domestic market will rely
heavily on urban and peri-urban consumers. Ugandans residing in urban areas
purchase about 90 percent of their food (UBOS 2001).
In this context, many Ugandan livestock sector participants are looking to
international markets, primarily in East Africa and the Middle East. These areas are
perceived to have fewer standards constraints than the European Union and the
United States, and thus to be more realistic targets. However, to sell products to
these markets, Ugandan producers would need the capacity to ensure consistent
quality and supply; sector participants indicated this would be a challenge.
In the Middle East [there] are not so many barriers, but the quantity issue is a
problem. The contracts require consistent supply, such as 350 live white goats per
week. To meet that demand we would need trucks, transport, stocking materials.
For export crops, Uganda cannot even meet its quotas for most of its trade
agreements, so there is a problem internally in the agriculture structure and the
quality of what we produce…
The reality is that the number of constraints mean that the potential might remain
rhetoric. For example, supply-side constraints such as load shedding (see footnote
number 4), and infrastructure. The way it is now, there's no deliberate effort to
address the supply issues. We wouldn't have the capacity to supply those markets.
Additionally, the government would need to address trade and regulatory issues.
Research indicates that there is potential for export of livestock products to these

8

This figure reflects consumption of goods produced within the household as well as cash expenditures. UBOS valued home
produce at farm gate prices.

9

While the majority of food crops are consumed within the household, about two th The domestic market is constrainedrds
of livestock and livestock products are marketed (MAAIF 2004).

10
Reluctance to shift towards commercial production may also reflect fears about political instability. Small-scale
agricultural production allowed many people to survive during the Amin regime and the instability that followed.
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markets if constraints are addressed (King 2002a, b, c).11 In 2001, the government
announced a strategic exports promotion initiative which would include beef, hides
and skins (King 2002a; Spilsbury, Naggaga, and Oyat 2003:20-21).

Regulation and Enforcement
Many livestock sector participants argued that regulation and enforcement are also
major challenges. Without good information regarding quality and enforcement of
standards, there is little incentive for producers, traders and processors to invest in
improving quality; poor quality milk will sell for the same price as high-grade milk.
However, the capacity of government to enforce regulations, and of producers to
meet high standards, is limited. Several interviewees suggested that the Dairy
Development Authority’s (DDA) approach has potential. The DDA, a parastatal
organization established to support the dairy sector, has used a mix of encouragement
and enforcement to pressure traders to invest in hygienic storage facilities for milk.
In introducing reforms, the DDA has consulted with dairy sector associations,
developed timetables in partnership with these associations, and worked with private
companies to ensure that appropriate equipment would be available for purchase.
The DDA also has emphasized the benefits of new practices to traders and processors—
for example, reduced spoilage could increase the volume of saleable milk. After
regulations come into force, enforcement efforts—such as arrests of traders using
plastic Jerry cans—are publicized widely. The DDA has used this approach to shift
milk traders from plastic Jerry cans to more hygienic metal cans and to encourage
traders to set up coolers at collection points and to invest in refrigerated tankers.
This strategy allows the DDA to make effective use of its limited resources; there are
only seven regulatory enforcement staff, including four inspectors. (The DDA also
works with The National Bureau of Standards and the police force to enforce dairy
regulations). In a context in which enforcement resources are limited, it makes sense
to encourage good practice as well as punishing transgression.
This overview has focused on the structure of the Ugandan livestock sector, and the
challenges faced in raising and marketing livestock. Although these constraints are
serious, most are amenable to intervention. The remainder of this paper focuses on
the political and economic context in which livestock producers, processors, traders
and policymakers operate. This context facilitates some sector interventions while
making others much more difficult. Discussion of recent interventions that affect
poor livestock producers, such as the Plan for the Modernization of Agriculture, the
privatization of the Dairy Corporation and the African Development Bank-funded
Livestock Development Program is integrated into the paper.

11
Although sector participants suggested that export markets would benefit all producers, it seems likely that large,
commercially oriented farmers would be best positioned to benefit.
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SECTION II: NATIONAL RESISTANCE MOVEMENT GOVERNANCE:
POLITICS IN SEMI-AUTHORITARIAN UGANDA
Yoweri Museveni and the National Resistance Movement took power in January 1986
after winning a five year guerrilla war.12 Since that time, the government has rebuilt
many of the state institutions and much of the infrastructure destroyed between 1971
and 1985. The discussion that follows begins by describing the conflicts that continue
to affect many parts of Uganda. It then shifts to analysis of the semi-authoritarian
regime Museveni has created.13 The Ugandan state devolves substantial power to
elected local governments and provides opportunities for participation in policy
processes. However, security remains an overriding priority, civil liberties are not
consistently respected, and the government relies upon clientelism to secure support.
In this context, citizens are unlikely to take full advantage of opportunities to
participate. The discussion in this section focuses on electoral politics and other
formal political structures. Policy reforms and the consultative and participatory
processes established by government are discussed in the next section.

Enduring Conflict in Northern and Eastern Uganda
The nineteen years of government under Museveni’s National Resistance Movement
(NRM) represent the longest period of stability many Ugandans have experienced since
independence in 1962. In stable areas, the governance and economic reforms
discussed in subsequent sections of this paper have had a major impact. But many
areas of Uganda do not enjoy stability. Of the 56 districts, fourteen have experienced
sustained conflict since 1986 (Tripp 2004). In these areas, government interventions
have focused on ending the conflicts. Districts in the north and east of Uganda have
been most deeply affected. In the north, the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) has led an
armed struggle against the government, often with support from the Sudanese
government (Prunier 2004).14 The Uganda People’s Defense Forces (UPDF) is the
primary organization fighting the insurgents, but the government has encouraged
citizens to form militias and vigilante groups to defend themselves. Occasional
periods of stability have been followed by renewed violence, and more than one
million Ugandans reside in Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camps or engage in
“night commuting” in which rural people flee their homes for the relative safety of
the town each night (CSOPNU 2004; Van Acker 2004). Museveni originally emphasized
military defeat of insurgents over political negotiation (Oloka-Onyango 2004; Van
Acker 2004), but the government has recently renewed efforts to reach a peaceful
settlement with the LRA. Civil society organizations also have sought an end to the
conflict. Civil Society Organisations for Peace in Northern Uganda, a coalition of
about 40 international and domestic NGOs, has advocated a rights based approach to
address the root causes of the conflict (CSOPNU 2004).
In the Karamoja region of north-eastern Uganda, cattle rustling has devastated many
communities.15 Victims and government officials have frequently blamed Karamajong

12
The name of the organization that holds power has changed several times. The National Resistance Army became the
National Resistance Movement and it is now the National Resistance Movement Organization. This paper uses the name
National Resistance Movement throughout to refer to the Movement after the end of the guerrilla war.
13

This paper follows Tripp (2004) in describing Uganda’s current political regime as semi-authoritarian.

14

The Lords Resistance Army was preceded by the Holy Spirit Movement, which began in approximately 1987. The districts
of Gulu, Kitgum, and Pader (Acholiland) have been the center of conflict for several years, but the conflict has spread south
and eastward to Lira, Katakwi, Soroti and Kaberamaido.
15

Karamoja includes Moroto, Kotido, and Nakapiririt districts. Cattle raiding often affects communities in neighboring
districts as well.
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pastoralists for rustling; cattle raiding is a traditional practice. However, many
researchers contend that rustling dynamics are much more complex. The following
examples suggest some of the complexities. Firstly, while external portrayals of
rustling have tended to treat it as a single phenomenon, the Karamajong distinguish
between cattle raiding, which enjoys legitimacy, and small-scale cattle theft and
roadside banditry, which are less acceptable (Management Systems International et al.
2002). Secondly, small arms have become widespread in the region since the 1970s
(Mirzeler and Young 2000). These arms are less subject to cultural sanction than
traditional weapons, they facilitate predation, and they can make it more difficult to
resolve conflicts. Government strategy towards armed individuals has fluctuated from
attempts to use them as government auxiliaries to attempts to disarm them.
Increasing pressure on land may also have increased reliance on raiding as other
response to drought and famine have become less viable (Walker 2002). Finally, it is
not clear that the Karamajong are the only or principal cattle rustling perpetrators;
some contend that members of the military are rustling cattle (Dolan 2000; Van Acker
2004). In conflict-ridden parts of Uganda, ending violence would be a significant
move towards improving the livelihoods of livestock producers and other residents.
These conflicts have political implications in addition to their devastating
humanitarian costs. First, the conflict reduces the funds available for social and
economic investment in areas such as livestock. The government allocates substantial
funds to security. Defense expenditures officially comprised 12.87 percent of the
2002/2003 budget, amounting to more than 2.5 percent of GDP (World Bank 2003).16
That year, the government increased defense spending by 20 percent, shifting funds
away from other areas despite donor sanctions.17 Defense spending increased again in
2003/2004 by close to 20 percent, and approximately US$200 million has been
allocated for defense in 2005/2006 (Akwapt 2005). Donors have continued to express
concern about the disproportionate amounts devoted to security (Development
Partners 2004). Museveni’s views on this issue are reflected in the following
statement, “We are therefore continuing to strengthen our defense forces: to neglect
doing so would be like exposing meat when there are dangerous carnivores around”
(Museveni 2000, quoted in Oloka-Onyango 2004). International humanitarian agencies
and foreign donors spend enormous sums on relief; the government spends a smaller
amount on post-conflict recovery.
Second, the ongoing conflict reinforces the influence of the security apparatus–
including the military, police and militias–relative to elected officials and civil
servants. It is extremely difficult to hold security organizations accountable when
there is ongoing conflict. However, if elected officials cannot make binding decisions
without the consent of the military, then the regime is not democratic.18 There is
evidence that the defense forces have engaged in humanitarian abuses and financial
misdeeds within Uganda (CSOPNU 2004; HRW 2004; 2003; Omara-Otunnu 1992). Illegal
behaviour by members of the Ugandan security apparatus also has been well
documented in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Jackson 2002; Reno 2002; UNSC
2000; 2002). The perpetrators include individuals close to the president, and for the
most part, the individuals implicated in these scandals have not suffered severe

16
In 1999, the IMF set an upper limit on military spending of 1.9 percent of GDP; above that proportion, loans might be
delayed or halted (Reno 2002).
17

Defense expenditures comprised 14.08 percent of the total. In response, some donors (the United Kingdom and Ireland)
withheld US$20 million in funds (DFID 2003).
18

To have a democracy “the elected government must to a reasonable degree have effective power to rule” (Collier and
Levitsky 1997). Much of the literature on the relationship between democracy and military power was developed in the
context of debates about political regimes in Central and South America in which substantial powers were reserved for the
military in ostensibly democratic regimes.
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sanctions.19 Reno (2002) argues, “predation solves short-term problems of political
control by keeping soldiers occupied” but undermines the ability of the state to
control these “violence entrepreneurs” in the long run. Oloka-Onyango (2004) argues
that Museveni’s reliance on the military has undermined attempts to reduce
corruption, reform the civil-service, and create democratic local government.

Semi-authoritarian Politics: “No Party Democracy” and Local
Governance
In relatively stable regions of Uganda, the semi-authoritarian regime established by
Museveni is the operative political context (Tripp 2004). Semi-authoritarian regimes
occupy a middle space between democracy and authoritarianism. Concisely defined,
democracies are political systems in which “elections are competitive, free,
egalitarian, decisive and inclusive, and those who vote in principle also have the right
to be elected—they are political citizens” (O'Donnell 2001). Authoritarian regimes, on
the other hand, are organized political systems in which citizens have few political
rights, but the government does not engage in extensive mobilization, unlike
totalitarian regimes in which citizens are expected to participate in organized
political activities.20 Tripp (2004) argues that semi-authoritarian regimes are
distinguished by “their lack of consistency in guaranteeing civil and political
liberties.” Uganda’s political system combines substantial restrictions on political
participation with regular elections and other opportunities for citizens to influence
political decisions. While Ugandan citizens ostensibly enjoy freedom of expression
and association, human rights organizations have documented torture and abuse of
individuals expressing unpopular viewpoints (FHRI 2003; HRW 2004; 2003). At the
same time, the media is relatively free and statements critical of the government are
regularly published.
After taking power, Museveni’s NRM government established a “no-party” or
“Movement” democracy. Museveni saw political parties as a source of divisiveness and
instability. Although the NRM did not formally disband existing political parties, they
were prohibited from nominating candidates for office. All Ugandans were deemed to
belong to the “Movement system” which would provide a broad tent for political
debate and decision-making.
“Movement” democracy means that individuals have the right to join the national
political movements and participate in elected government councils in their places of
residence. Their elected representatives form additional councils in each larger
administrative unit. Since the Movement embraces all citizens who wish to join, its
operation is considered incompatible with activity by political parties (Kasfir 2000).
The system was initially described as transitional; Ugandan’s political liberties would
increase over time as the state was rebuilt and citizens and organizations began to
approach politics from a broader, less parochial perspective.

19

The government has established several anticorruption institutions and now conducts surveys to investigate corruption,
but these institutions appear to be ineffective in punishing abuse of office by high-level officials (Flanary and Watt 1999;
Tangri and Mwenda 2001; Uganda. Inspectorate of Government 2003). The president’s brother Salim Saleh, who is a major
general, was implicated in these scandals.

20

This definition draws from Linz (2000) who described authoritarian regimes as “political systems with limited, not
responsible political pluralism, without elaborate and guiding ideology but with distinctive mentalities; without extensive or
intensive political mobilization except at some points in their development; and in which a leader or occasionally a small
group exercises power within formally ill-defined limits but actually quite predictable ones.”
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Many citizens and some observers were initially sympathetic to the “no party
democracy.”21 Ugandans’ experience with party-based competition has been largely
negative. Colonial practices exacerbated religious and ethnic divisions, and most
political parties in independent Uganda have had a narrow religious or ethnic base.22
Early Museveni Cabinets incorporated individuals from the major political parties, and
the government established new local government structures that provided
opportunities for popular participation. These practices suggested that there was
space for a diversity of views and for participation without parties. Building on the
local “Resistance Council” model developed during the war, the Museveni government
created a multi-tier system of local councils throughout the country (Kasfir 2004;
Mamdani 1996: Chapter 6).
Local governments enjoy substantial power, and
councillors are selected by Ugandans. Citizens directly elect members of the village
council (LC1), sub-county council (LC3) and district council (LC5). The parish councils
(LC2) and county councils (LC4) are indirectly elected.23 Local governments are
responsible for education, road services, agricultural extension, land administration,
trade licensing and community development. District Public Service Commissions have
authority to hire and fire civil servants in these areas.
Ugandans had no direct involvement in national affairs until 1994, when elections
were held to select delegates to the Constitutional Assembly.24 The first presidential
elections were held in 1996 by which time, Museveni had been head of state for 10
years. These elections violated the “free” and “egalitarian” requirements for
democratic elections. The Movement “system” was exempt from the restrictions
imposed on political parties.25 In the 1996 and 2001 presidential elections, opposition
candidates and their supporters were subject to intimidation and harassment (FHRI
2003; Sabiti-Makara, Tukahebwa, and Byarugaba 2003). In 2001, the losing candidate,
Col. Besigye Kizza, challenged the election results in court. The court ruling upheld
the results but acknowledged irregularities (Judgment on Election Petition No. 1 of
2001: Col. (RTD) Dr. Besigye Kizza, Petitioner v. 1. Museveni Yoweri Kaguta Respondent, 2. Electoral Commission. 2001).26 In 2000, Uganda held a national
referendum on the Movement system in which voters were asked to choose between
the Movement system and multiparty democracy. The movement system won
overwhelmingly (See Bratton and Lambright 2001; Therkildsen 2002), but the
referendum was nullified by the Constitutional Court in late 2004 because Parliament
had not followed the proper procedures in passing the act enabling the referendum.
In 2002, Parliament passed the Political Parties and Organizations Act after several
years of debate. The Act restricted party activities severely, prohibiting members of
the security forces, public officers and traditional and cultural leaders from belonging
to political parties, expressing views on party controversies, or engaging in activities
on the behalf of the party (Section 16). It also prohibited parties from offering
political platforms (Section 18(1(a))), opening branch offices (Section 18(1(c))),

21
See the range of views expressed in No Party Democracy in Uganda: Myths and Realities (Mugaju and Oloka-Onyango 2000;
also see Ottemoeller 1998).
22

See the following for discussion of social divisions and politics in Uganda (Apter 1961; Carbone 2003; Karugire 1980;
Mamdani 1976; Okuku 2002). Apter, Mamdani, and Karugire discuss the colonial and early independence periods, while Okuku
and Carbone focus on contemporary politics.
23

One third of the seats on each council are reserved for women, and there are special councillors to represent youth, the
disabled, and the elderly (village-level only).
24

Before these elections, an indirectly elected National Resistance Council served as the national parliament.

25

These elections were governed by transitional provisions of the 1995 Constitution, which allowed political parties to exist
but banned most organized political activities. “… Political activities may continue except— (a) opening and operating
branch offices; (b) holding delegates conferences; (c) holding public rallies; (d) sponsoring or offering a platform to or in any
way campaigning for or against a candidate for any public elections; (e) carrying on any activities that may interfere with the
movement's political system for the time being in force” (Section 269).

26

Besigye was detained on two occasions and subsequently left the country.
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holding more than one national meeting per year (Section 18(2)) and interfering with
the Movement system (which was explicitly not a party27) (Section 19). All of these
provisions, except Section 16, have been declared unconstitutional by the
Constitutional Court, and political parties have started to open branch offices,
prepare platforms and hold meetings.
Over time, criticism of the no-party Movement system has increased.28 Critiques have
come from former NRM stalwarts and high-level Museveni supporters, including Col.
Besigye Kizza and former Cabinet ministers Kategaya and Matembe, as well as
opposition parties, human rights activists, scholars and foreign organizations.29
Critiques have highlighted the narrowing ethnic base of the cabinet (Kjaer 2004),
favouritism displayed towards Museveni’s co-ethnies in military promotions (Okuku
2002),30 corruption (Tangri and Mwenda 2001) and the party-like character of the NRM
(Tripp 2004). Surveys provide evidence that the President’s popularity has declined
slightly and support for the Movement system has declined (Logan et al. 2003).
Ugandan citizens and scholars have also begun to look critically at local governance
structures (Francis and James 2003). While decentralization ostensibly was intended
to bring government closer to the people, much of the decision-making power is
concentrated at the district level. People have much less contact with district
officials than with their village councillors, and it is difficult for citizens to hold these
officials accountable. The concentration of power in districts is evident in planning
processes and revenue collection and allocation. Although the village councils
coordinate the development of Community Action Plans, these plans are then passed
upwards to each level until they reach the district, which adopts an integrated plan
based on the input of civil servants and NGOs as well as elected officials (Francis and
James 2003). Districts also collect the graduated tax, the primary local revenue
source, and District Tender Boards control tender allocation—many districts have
privatized the collection of local taxes and fees.31 The district governments receive 35
percent of locally generated revenue while Village Councils receive only 16.25
percent. Francis and James argue that the Council system operates in “patronage
mode.” District control over civil service positions and tendering allows for politicized
distribution of these divisible goods; the more accessible village councillors have little
power. Although there have been notable successes, some frustration with the system
is evident (MFPED 2002; also see MOLG 2004). One interviewee commented, “The
poor people have spoken but nobody cares. Look at the local councillors. A person is
a councillor for two years and they have a huge compound and there is no delivery.”

27

Section 2 (1) defines a “political organisation” as “any free association or organisation of persons the objects of which
include the influencing of the political process or sponsoring a political agenda whether or not it also seeks to sponsor or
offer a platform to a candidate for election to a political office or to participate in the governance of Uganda at any level”; a
political party is a political organization with a platform or candidates. Section 2 (2) states “The definition of ‘political
organisation in subsection (1) shall not include the following— (a) the movement political system referred to in article 70 of
the Constitution and the organs under the movement political system.”

28

Tripp (2004) argues that 1995 was a turning point in the Museveni regime in which the government moved away from
inclusionary governance towards a ruling strategy that favors loyalists and seeks to repress dissent; Okuku (2002; 2005)
argues that Museveni’s ruling strategy has been narrowly ethnic and authoritarian from the start.
29
Uganda is extremely dependent upon foreign aid, as is discussed in Section III. To date, multilateral lending agencies and
bilateral donors have refrained from imposing political conditionality on Uganda as was done in Kenya and Malawi. Donors
have advocated, often behind the scenes, for greater democratization, (Hauser 1999).
30
At independence, the Ugandan military was largely comprised of Northerners, including ethnic Acholi and Lango. Okuku
claims that military recruitment and promotions now favor Museveni’s ethnic group, the Bahiima, and other people from
southwestern Uganda. He estimates that 10 percent of the military now come from Museveni’s home county.

31

In his 2005 State of the Union address, President Museveni announced that the graduated tax would be eliminated, and
central government would begin paying the salaries of district chairpersons, district executive members, sub-county and
town council chairpersons.
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Uganda’s political environment sends mixed signals to its citizens. On the one hand,
Ugandans are provided with real opportunities for participation and accountability.
Local governments have considerable powers, and research indicates that Ugandans
respect their village councillors, for the most part, and see the Village Council as an
important and useful institution (MPFED 2002; Therkildsen 2002). In theory, citizens
could use their votes to remove unpopular officials, and some voters are trying to use
elections to hold officials accountable: “We have got our pangas and sharpened them.
Those snakes shall be wiped out using the votes” (MPFED 2002). Although turnover in
councillors is low (Francis and James 2003), Okuku (2005) states that there is a 70
percent turnover rate in MPs in each election. Elected officials exert some decisionmaking power, and there are some cases in which capable officials have managed to
improve outcomes. In Ntungamo District, for example, residents reported better
service delivery and more willingness to pay taxes than people from other districts
included in the second Ugandan Participatory Poverty Assessment.32 They also linked
improved services to capable governance by local officials (MPFED 2002). In addition,
official policies state that local programs are to be developed through participatory
processes.
On the other hand, Ugandans are implicitly told that their participation is neither
consequential nor desirable. As the local government system is structured, the most
accessible village councillors have very limited authority; district officials have much
greater authority. The influence of local voters is also diminished by the technocratic
processes through which the national government uses its financial influence over
local governments to make local governments upwardly accountable to national
bureaucrats (Craig and Porter 2003; Francis and James 2003). Central government
transfers account for about 90 percent of local government incomes, and much of the
revenue transferred its conditional. Efforts to hold local officials accountable have
been constrained by widespread clientelism and corruption.
In each of the
participatory poverty assessments, rural Ugandans and civil servants described and
condemned corruption among local politicians; district officials were regarded as most
corrupt (MPFED 2000; 2002). Corrupt activities included undermining service delivery
and manipulation of the tendering process; there were very few instances in which
corrupt individuals were sanctioned. The second national participatory poverty
assessment report describes one case as follows:
… in 2001 in Madudu Sub-county, that covers Kitemba village in Mubende, the District
Chief Internal Auditor audited the Sub-county’s finances after a complaint by the LC3
Chairman about misappropriation of funds. The audit discovered anomalies in the
management of LGDP [Local Government Development Programme] funds and
embezzlement of other funds. The Sub-county Chief and Sub-Treasurer were
arrested. However, the Chief Administrative Officer (CAO), much to the concern of
community members and LC3 councillors, later released them (MPFED 2002:173).
The 2002 report also described the recent emergence of mass vote buying; Muhumuza
(2003) contends that vote buying and intimidation were widespread in the first local
government elections. Local government elections are particularly vulnerable to
corruption and intimidation because voting is not by secret ballot, as in presidential
and parliamentary elections (Mutumba et al. 2005)

32

The Ugandan Participatory Poverty Assessment Project is a Ugandan government initiative to incorporate the perspectives
of poor Ugandans into the poverty reduction policy process. Research teams conducted participatory rural appraisals in
several sites across the country. These appraisals were developed into district reports and national reports, and results were
disseminated at the community, district, and national level. The published reports provide more detail on the research
methodology (See, for example, MFPED 2000; 2002).
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Museveni’s harsh criticism of dissenters and the prolonged detention and torture of
some individuals who have contested elections without NRM support sends a clear
message that participation is only welcome within limits (See HRW 2004). The 2002
Suppression of Terrorism Act gives the government broad powers to act against
perceived opponents of the state. Ugandans may fear that criticism of councillors or
the councils will be interpreted as criticism of the NRM.
Given these mixed signals, most citizens are unlikely to take full advantage of the
opportunities that may exist. Recent agricultural initiatives emphasize a demand-led
approach. The National Agricultural Advisory Services (NAADS), for example, provides
extension services in response to farmer group requests. If farmers are uncomfortable
making demands, the program cannot succeed. However, the political context in
Uganda is continuing to evolve, and some civil society organizations (CSOs) are
encouraging citizens to engage with local government.33
Some grassroots communities tend to associate policy work with going against
government. It is the process of building awareness around participation in the need
for everyone to engage.... We can use service provision as a way to build awareness
about processes and rights.
Several CSOs have altered their structure to facilitate interaction with local
governments. The Uganda NGO forum, for example, has established district forums in
several areas, and the Uganda National Farmers Federation includes 45 district
associations. These CSOs may provide an organized means for livestock producers to
influence district policies and to take advantage of demand driven programs.
At present, the overriding political question is that of presidential succession, or
continuity. The 1995 Constitution limits individuals to two terms as President, and
Museveni’s second term will end in 2006. Museveni has sought to retain his hold on
power by eliminating the constitutional limit on presidential terms in office. Museveni
and his advisers floated this issue in public settings on several occasions. For
example, President Museveni was quoted as saying, “I have been hearing people
talking of a ‘third term’ for the incumbent president” (Oloka-Onyango 2003). Then
government established a Constitutional Review Commission. After failing to obtain a
recommendation to eliminate term limits from the commission, the government
drafted a white paper recommending that Parliament decide this issue (Republic of
Uganda 2004).34 Parliament overwhelmingly comprises NRM adherents. Despite this,
the “Third Term” or “kisanja” debate inside Parliament and among the populace has
been lively and a range of views has been expressed. Two steps have been taken to
facilitate the elimination of term limits. First, the term limit provision has been
incorporated into a compendium bill including several other measures, some of which
also require constitutional amendments.35 Parliament must accept or reject the bill as
a whole. After the bill receives parliamentary approval, the government plans to hold
a referendum on the measures requiring constitutional amendments. Secondly,
Members of Parliament have been bribed to support the third term with payments of 5
million Ugandan shillings (about US$3,000).36 It is estimated that 223 Members of

33
Throughout this paper, civil society organization is used to refer to member based-associations, community-based
organizations, and domestic or international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). This reflects the Ugandan usage of the
term.
34
The government established a Constitutional Review Commission in 2001 to consider term limits and other issues. In its
2003 Final Report, the Commission recommended that the people decide this issue in a referendum.
35
The bill would also reduce restrictions on political parties, recognize Swahili as a second national language, and allow the
creation of multidistrict regional governance structures.
36
These payments were widely reported in the media, and several articles were published in the daily newspapers the
Monitor and the New Vision. Some individuals received a larger sum of up to 10 million shillings (US$ 6,000).
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Parliament, including 213 voting members, accepted the “kisanja cash” (Gyezaho
2004); constitutional amendments require the support of two thirds of Parliament, or
204 members. Parliament passed a resolution authorizing a referendum in early May
2005; shortly thereafter the major opposition parties announced that they would
boycott the referendum. The referendum is scheduled for late July 2005. The next
elections for the President, Members of Parliament and District Council chairmen are
scheduled for February and March 2006.
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SECTION III: REFORMING UGANDA: NEO-LIBERALISM & PARTICIPATION
This section discusses Uganda’s economic reforms, participatory processes, and their
influence on policymaking. Since 1986, the NRM government has implemented major
economic reforms that seek to alter the state’s basic approach to the market and
service provision. This section begins by discussing the alliance that has successfully
advocated reform. It then turns to bureaucratic politics and the strategies adopted by
civil servants skeptical of neo-liberal reform. The reformist alliance also has focused
attention on poverty, and national government has created participatory processes
such as the Participatory Poverty Eradication Process through which farmers’
associations and other members of civil society can shape policy. These processes
provide opportunities for pro-poor interventions. However, major policy decisions
continue to occur largely outside the public domain. The final part of this section
discusses the privatization of the Dairy Corporation. This case illustrates the limited
influence of sector participants and highlights the potential of the Ugandan media to
raise the visibility of less than transparent processes.

Liberal Reform Alliance
The alliance between key actors in the Ugandan government and major multilateral
and bilateral donors has assisted the government to implement major reforms,
including economic liberalization and decentralization. The relationship between the
Ugandan government and foreign donors and lenders has evolved over time as Uganda
moved from reluctant adherence, through structural adjustment conditionalities, to a
working relationship based on ongoing consultation with its “development partners.”
Well reasoned proposals that fit within the framework on which government and
donors agree find a receptive hearing. Reducing poverty is an explicit objective of
government policy and foreign aid; there are substantial opportunities to implement
pro-poor interventions that fit within the framework.
Museveni’s National Resistance Movement initially attempted to follow a divergent
path, but price and foreign exchange controls failed to end the economic crisis. It
was in this context that the government accepted conditional aid from multilateral
lenders in 1987. The economic reform package advocated by donors was a fairly
standard mix of economic stabilization and structural adjustment measures.37 Reforms
sought to create macroeconomic stability, to increase Uganda’s openness to the
international economy, and to reduce the state's role in the economy. The
government’s commitment to structural adjustment policies was initially weak and
implementation halting. In the early nineties, however, President Museveni became a
vocal advocate of reform and implementation improved (Dijkstra and Van Donge
2001).38
Uganda is extremely dependent upon foreign donors and lenders—official development
assistance accounted for more than 12 percent of GDP in fiscal year 2002/2003 (World
Bank 2003).39 Since 1987, foreign aid has almost always exceeded exports and tax

37
John Williamson identifies 10 principles of the Washington Consensus: fiscal discipline, public expenditure (investment is
greater than consumption), tax reform, financial liberalization, competitive exchange rates, trade liberalization, friendliness
to foreign direct investment, privatization, market deregulation, and secure property rights (1993, discussed in Van De Walle
2001: 138-139).
38
Scholars’ views on Uganda's implementation of economic reforms vary. While some argue that implementation of
economic reforms has been incomplete and plagued with corruption (Tangri and Mwenda 2001; van de Walle 2001), others
believe the government is committed to strict budgetary control and dismantling of parastatals and marketing structures
(Dijkstra and Van Donge 2001).
39

The World Bank is the largest multilateral lender to Uganda, and the United Kingdom is the largest bilateral donor.
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revenues (Dijkstra and Van Donge 2001). Donors fund about half of the government’s
budget (DFID 2003), and in fiscal year 2002/2003, official development assistance
accounted for more than 12 percent of GDP (World Bank 2003). Although the
relationship between donors and the Ugandan government was initially based on
conditionality, donors gradually became convinced of the government’s sincere
commitment to reform (Adam and Gunning 2002).40 One outcome has been a new way
of working based on ongoing consultation and reduced policy conditionality. The
“development partners” participate in the development of the overall framework and
sector programs through consultative group meetings and a wide array of working
groups, which include civil servants, donors and, sometimes, civil society. The
development partners also have created donor groups for specific areas of interest. In
line with this way of working, several agencies, including the World Bank, the
European Union, and the development agencies of the United Kingdom, Denmark, the
Netherlands, Ireland, Norway and Sweden have moved away from project funding
towards general budget support, poverty action fund support and sectoral basket
funding (World Bank).41 This new way of working has received substantial praise from
outside observers and many participants (Adam and Gunning 2002), but some members
of civil society believe that it gives foreign donors disproportionate influence as they
have greater access to the government than civil society organizations and ordinary
citizens.
Over time, Uganda became a “show case” for neo-liberal economic reform (Dijkstra
and Van Donge 2001). Uganda’s economy grew an average of 6.3 percent a year
during the 15 years following 1987, and inflation diminished substantially (Okidi et al.
2004). Additionally, the national poverty headcount fell from 55.7 percent in
1992/1993 to 33.8 percent in 1999/2000, and the rural poverty headcount fell from
59.7 percent to 37.4 percent over the same period (Okidi et al. 2004). Uganda’s
impressive economic growth was seen to demonstrate the benefits of reform policies,
and it became a favored recipient of foreign aid. By the end of the 1990s, however,
the growth rate had diminished and the poverty headcount increased to 37.7 percent
(national) and 41.7 percent (rural) in 2002/2003 (Okidi et al. 2004). Some but not all
of the reduced growth rate and rising poverty can be attributed to changing
commodity prices and unfavorable agricultural terms of trade (Okidi et al. 2004).
Many of the domestic contributors to the reduced growth rate may be difficult to
address.
These include the small size of the domestic market, limited and
inconsistent access to electricity, low agricultural productivity and high interest rates.
Although agriculture comprises a substantial proportion of GDP, and is the primary
source of most people’s livelihoods, agricultural productivity growth has been very
low.
There are some signs of tension in the government-donor partnership. International
donors were extremely displeased at the transfer of funds away from development
expenditures and toward security in 2002-3, and have expressed concern about human
rights, corruption and democratization (DANIDA 2003; Sweden 2004; DFID 2003).
Museveni has repeatedly lashed out at foreign donors, particularly after criticism of
his actions. To date, however, there are few signs that donors and lenders plan to
reduce their financial commitment to Uganda. Instead, the government of Uganda
and its development partners established a set of partnership principles in 2003
(MFPED 2004a). Since then, major bilateral and multilateral donors have raised
concerns about democratization, corruption, and human rights with Ugandan
government officials (Mugisa 2005; Mulumba 2005; Musoke 2005). However, only
Britain and Ireland had withheld funds based on these concerns as of June 2005.
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Uganda was the first country to qualify for debt relief under the enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC II)
initiative. Proceeds from debt relief are allocated to poverty alleviation through the Poverty Action Fund.
41

Basket funding is budget support earmarked for a particular area or initiative.
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Changing Governance and Bureaucratic Politics
The Ugandan government-donor partnership is based on shared commitment to a neoliberal framework. Central tenets of this framework are that the role of government
is to provide an enabling environment for the market, that service provision should be
demand driven, and that a transformation in the population from a subsistence
orientation to a market orientation is necessary.
Government provision of
macroeconomic stability is a core part of this enabling environment. This partnership
has positioned the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (MFPED)
as first among equals (Brock, McGee, and Ssewakiranga 2002). Because this ministry
develops overall spending targets and assigns a budget ceiling for each sector, it can
and does enforce fiscal discipline.42 The medium-term expenditure framework
estimates government revenue over the near term (three years) and establishes
spending targets which are linked to macroeconomic policy goals. Budget ceilings (or
spending caps) are established for each sector based on government priorities. The
sectoral working groups and the relevant ministries then decide how to allocate funds
within the ceiling. This process focuses on spending rather than revenue; the budget
ceiling may be smaller than the funds available.
Donors tend to see MPFED as a bulwark of support for the reform agenda in the face of
uncertain commitment to reform by bureaucrats more comfortable with old ways of
working in which the government provided services directly, and with limited
consultation.43 Although reform rhetoric pervades policy discourse—it is taken for
granted that government must justify public involvement in service provision and
‘interference’ in the economy—program proposals and comments in private settings
indicate that many civil servants are highly sceptical that government withdrawal is
appropriate given the weakness of the private sector. The following comment is
representative:
I am a believer in promoting private industry, but government cannot get out of
everything. That is why we have become stagnant. Strategic interventions, market
failures, we did it [privatization] and we have not done well. There are market
failures. Politicians and the private sector believe the government sector divested
itself too early. We must redefine the government role.
As with other government ministries, the role of the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal
Industries and Fisheries (MAAIF) has changed substantially. As Animal Production and
Marketing Commissioner Saamanya summarized:
The Ministry is no longer directly responsible for service delivery. Instead, it seeks to
play a facilitatory role and to create an enabling environment. Functions: one, policy
formulation and review; two, national planning of programs and projects; three,
standard-setting, laws and regulations; four, technical support to local governments so
that quality services are provided –this includes training and capacity building; five,
control of epidemic diseases; six, monitoring and evaluation (interview).
MAAIF’s new role requires substantial institutional transformation. Previously, MAAIF
had a large staff of agricultural extension and animal health officers who were
directly responsible for service provision.
Many of these officials have been
transferred to the districts and no longer report to MAAIF, but observers suggest that
MAAIF has been slow to embrace its new role. Reformers have often chosen to work
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The primary area in which the spending limits are disregarded is security. Some executive offices, including the Office of
the Prime Minister, have also consistently overspent (World Bank 2003).
43

DFID targeted individuals in this ministry for support of the reform agenda (Brock, McGee, and Ssewakiranga 2002).
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around existing government institutions given their uncertain commitment to reform.
While MAAIF seeks to reform itself, the government has created, and donors have
funded, new organizations to implement the new policy approach. In the agriculture
sector, new organizations include the Plan for Modernisation of Agriculture (PMA)
Secretariat, the Dairy Development Authority (DDA) and the National Animal Genetic
Resources Centre and Databank (NAGRC&DC).44
The PMA is a multisectoral and multi-ministerial initiative that seeks to reduce
poverty by improving agricultural productivity. In general, the PMA seeks to shift
farmers from a subsistence orientation to a commercial orientation, to increase the
proportion of goods that are marketed and to address barriers to increased
productivity. The PMA Secretariat has been the focus of substantial contention.
Formally, the Secretariat is simply a coordinating body. It reports to a steering
committee comprising all of the participating ministries and has little formal
authority. However, there is tension between the PMA and MAAIF. Observers suggest
that MAAIF has been sidelined in the reform process: “[MAAIF is] not the policy
engine, it doesn't set the direction of agriculture in Uganda. And the people you look
at are the PMA and the Ministry of Finance [MPFED] and donors” (Also see Spilsbury,
Naggaga, and Oyat 2003). Tension is exacerbated by a perception that donors have
favored new organizations at the expense of MAAIF. In one donor’s view this
perception is both inaccurate, as agricultural expenditures have increased, and due to
the Ministry’s failure to finalize its development strategy and investment plan.
MAAIF’s perceived failure to adapt to the new policy environment may hinder its
efforts to secure funds.
While some observers have articulated substantive critiques of the PMA and its
components (Ashley and Nanyeenya 2002; Bahiigwa, Rigby, and Woodhouse 2005;
Manyire and Emmett 2004), its opponents within MAAIF have chosen not to challenge
the PMA openly. Instead, they have failed to prioritize PMA initiatives in budgetary
allocations and have questioned its accomplishments. The PMA identified seven
priority areas for public investment: agricultural research and technology
development, agricultural advisory services, rural financial services, agricultural
education, agricultural marketing and agro-processing, natural resource use and
management, and development of supportive physical infrastructure. MAAIF is the
lead ministry for the first two areas. Progress has been extremely uneven, and it is
generally agreed that reform of agricultural advisory services is most advanced. A
new organization, National Agricultural Advisory Services (NAADS), was created and
has started to provide services on a demand driven, contract-based approach in
several districts. While critics assert that NAADS has received disproportionate
funding, program implementation has been hindered by the allocation of substantially
fewer funds than were anticipated. Because NAADS received 13 billion Ugandan
shillings rather than the budgeted Ush19 billion in 2003, it had to delay expansion of
the program to six more districts (Bahiigwa, Rigby, and Woodhouse 2005). In the 2004
review, a NAADS official indicated that budget cuts in 2003/4 and spending
projections for the two years to follow would require the program to reduce the
number of sub counties involved from 153 to 137; NAADS was originally projected to
be operational in 309 sub-counties by this point (NAADS 2004). In this context, NAADS
officials are understandably defensive.45
The National Agricultural Research
Organization (NARO), which is leading agricultural research and technology
development, also has failed to receive anticipated funding. The priority areas of the
PMA that are led by ministries other than MAAIF are much less advanced. Although
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The NAGRC&DC supports genetic improvement efforts and is seeking to commercialize provision of artificial insemination
and breeding services.
45

A donor advocated and financed external assessment should provide a more objective evaluation in the near future. The
International Food Policy Research Institute is also developing a relationship with NAADS.
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MAAIF officials are sometimes hostile to the PMA, they regard it as an important
initiative and are engaged in ongoing interaction with the Secretariat. It has been
difficult for the PMA Secretariat to obtain high-level participation and funding priority
from the non-agricultural ministries with primary responsibility for the other priority
areas. The Secretariat is attempting to address these problems.46
The PMA and NAADS initiatives demonstrate the limitations of creating organizations
as a response to resistance to reform. While these organizations provide a means to
work around recalcitrant bureaucrats, it is difficult for them to succeed without allies
within existing organizations. Donors have the ability to dedicate funds to favored
initiatives—by allocating money to the NAADS’s basket, for example—but civil servants
outside MFPED also have a number of strategies at their disposal. The case of the
African Development Bank (ADB) Livestock Development Program loan illustrates some
of the strategies used by civil servants in the new environment.
The ADB Livestock Development Program will provide the Ugandan government with
approximately US$30 million in loan funds over five years (ADB 2002). The program
seeks to “reduce rural poverty by increasing the commercial orientation of subsistence
agriculture through sustainable increases in livestock productivity and meat output.”
The program has six components: livestock restocking and genetic improvement,
improved livestock health status, improved livestock water supply and forest
resources, improved livestock marketing systems, improved livestock information, and
program coordination. Several of the activities described and project documents are
inconsistent with the new role of MAAIF described above. For example, the program
will give animals to households and construct cattle dips, valley dams and slaughter
slabs. These interventions may be well advised and pro-poor in their impact, but they
are clearly inconsistent with the new approach.
It seems clear that the civil servants pushing this project exploited procedural
ambiguities in the project approval process.47 New agricultural projects are supposed
to receive approval from MAAIF and MFPED, but at the time this program was
approved, it was not clear which ministry had the final say, nor which subpart of
MFPED should grant approval. One sector participant stated:
... it was quite interesting hearing them [MFPED]…discuss this issue and getting a
viewpoint. It is 180° of difference from what our perception is as people working in
agriculture sector.
They were saying, ‘No, no, …the approval comes from
agriculture,’ and we said ‘No, no, finance approves it,’ and they said ‘No, no, it's not
us,... it's you guys!’ we said ‘Look, who approves these big loans?’ … of course, the
point is that decision-making is very confused. It is not clear who makes the
decisions.
Additionally, once a project has been entered into the budget, it is incorporated into
the budget ceiling. So MAAIF staff could indicate to MFPED that the project had been
approved and put it into their budget. This task was made easier by the low level of
activity in the agricultural sector working group. As indicated earlier, sectoral
working groups develop the sector budgets. Some working groups meet regularly, thus
providing an opportunity for regular oversight of policy implementation, but the
agricultural working group does not.
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A draft Agro processing and marketing strategy has been developed, and donors are grappling with approaches to rural
financial services. As discussed, problems with power provision affect all processors and marketers. In 2003, only 1 percent
of rural areas had access to electricity (Kiwawulo and Arinaitwe 2004).

47

Discussion of this case is based on my interviews; it may not present a wholly accurate view of the process.
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The adoption of the livestock development program has two consequences, which may
be viewed favourably by critics of liberal governance and unfavourably by reformers.
First, the program allows MAAIF to undertake activities that fit comfortably within its
old style of working and addresses perceived gaps in the new approach. In interviews,
many actors within and outside MAAIF questioned whether conditions existed for
market forces to produce desired outcomes without greater government intervention.
In particular, people highlighted the weakness of the private sector and the lack of
supportive infrastructure for livestock markets and disease control. In the new
system, producers are expected to pay for animal health services which are regarded
as a private good.48
However, preventive animal health care often require
infrastructure whose cost may be prohibitive for small producers. Local governments
could choose to create shared facilities, such as cattle dips and weighing stations, but
few have done so.
The role of the local authority is very unclear. Although they are responsible for
endemic diseases they are just displacing responsibility. For example, tick and tsetse
fly diseases are considered to be local [responsibilities], but the farmers are held
responsible for the infrastructure for controlling these diseases. You need dips,
sprays, and pumps. For tsetse, you could buy traps but you need chemicals.
The traders told me that there are no weighing stations in the livestock markets...
There was market infrastructure prior to the conflict.
We had the proper
infrastructure -- weighing stations etc. All of these were vandalized during the
conflict. I have asked government, “what are you doing?” The local authorities are
running away from responsibility. They want to just privatize….The infrastructure
should be provided and then the private sector can manage it.
The livestock development program will enable MAAIF to put this infrastructure into
place. One program advocate stated, “We see this as a strategic intervention

where assistance is needed.”
The second consequence of the livestock development program is that it takes up a
great deal of space in the budget, thereby limiting the funds available to other
programs. The MFPED has established an integrated budget ceiling and allocates a
certain amount to each ministry. With the exception of security, MFPED has been firm
in enforcing the expenditure ceilings for each ministry. If MAAIF has committed to
spend Ush 10 million to implement the livestock development program, 10 million less
is available for other programs, regardless of available funding. These funds may well
be taken away from programs with less ministerial support. Because PMA initiatives
are funded through the sectoral budgets, they are vulnerable in this process. This
issue was discussed during the 2004 NAADS review:
Because of the restrictions of the MTEF [Medium-term Expenditure Framework] ceiling
and the fact that donor contributions to the basket funding of NAADS are linked to
GOU funding made available within MTEF, flow of funds to the programme had been
below those expected. This situation was becoming more serious… Donors emphasised
that there was no shortage of money to fully meet the funding commitments they had
made: however the principle of basket funding had to be preserved (Republic of
Uganda. National Agricultural Advisory Services 2004:15).

48
Economic theory distinguishes between private goods and public goods. A pure private goods exhibit excludability and
rivalry, that is, the benefits accrue to the user and one person's use prevents another's. Most goods fall somewhere along the
spectrum between public and private goods. For example, if a farmer builds a dip and vaccinates his cattle, he benefits
directly from reduced losses due to disease. However, neighboring farmers also are likely to benefit from reduced exposure
to sick animals. The farmer who invests in preventative healthcare is bearing the sole cost but does not monopolize the
benefits.
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While it is often the case that projects spend far less than is projected, these funds
remain unavailable to other programs unless project leaders revise their commitments
well before the end of the fiscal year.
The discussions of PMA/MAAIF tensions and the ADB loan illustrate some of the
dynamics of reform within the government. These cases show that civil servants have
the capacity to manipulate reform processes to support or undermine desired
initiatives. Livestock sector policy is unlikely to be wholly consistent as long as there
is deep disagreement within the bureaucracy about the appropriate approach.

Participatory Policy Processes: The Poverty Eradication Action Plan
For the most part, livestock producers and civil society organizations do not directly
participate in bureaucratic struggles. Instead, citizens and CSOs participate in policy
formulation through formal participatory processes and through direct contact with
policymakers and donors. The central government has created opportunities for
associations, organizations and local governments to participate in policy formulation.
These participatory processes have been pushed for and supported by major donors
(Brock, McGee, and Ssewakiranga 2002).
As these processes have become
institutionalized, many participants and observers have come to the conclusion that
participatory processes offer some opportunity for influence, but the options
considered are sharply constrained by the reform framework (Craig and Porter 2003).
The discussion that follows focuses on policy formulation with regard to poverty
reduction.49
Poverty reduction is a shared objective of government and its development partners.
The importance of poverty reduction is indicated by the decision to house the key
poverty agencies within the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development,
the most influential ministry. The Poverty Monitoring and Analysis Unit, the Uganda
Participatory Poverty Assessment Process and the Planning and Poverty Eradication
Section produce and publicize poverty data. They also have coordinated the
government’s poverty reduction policy process by jointly serving as the secretariat for
the Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP). The PEAP has provided the overall
framework for development since 1997. The PEAP articulates the government’s policy
priorities and approach to reducing poverty.50 Agriculture is identified as a priority
sector for antipoverty intervention and strategies for the agricultural sector are
provided in the Plan for Modernization of Agriculture (PMA).
Although the initial PEAP was developed by a consultant to MFPED in consultation with
the sector ministries and with little public participation, the process has become
progressively more participatory in each subsequent round – the PEAP is revised about
every two years. The most recent PEAP revision began in July 2003 and involved
systematic consultation with local government, the private sector and civil society.
Civil society and private sector organizations were represented on the thematic
diplomatic working groups, they submitted policy documents (Private Sector
Foundation Uganda 2003; Uganda National NGO Forum and CSO PEAP Revision Steering
Committee 2003), and they reviewed the draft PEAP.

49
Brock, McGee and Ssewakiranga (2002) also discuss Ugandan poverty policy processes, their potential, and their
limitations. Although the views in this section overlap substantially with those in their paper, this discussion is based
primarily on the author’s interviews.
50

The Poverty Eradication Action Plan serves as Uganda’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper for the World Bank.
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The PEAP process provides substantial opportunities for public participation while
ensuring the anti-poverty measures are consistent with the overall reform paradigm.
The March 2004 draft stated:
Government’s strategy for poverty eradication is based on transformation of the
economy through private investment, industrialisation and export-led growth.
Industrialisation in Uganda will be based on the country’s endowments of natural
resources and labour. Private investment will make these endowments more
productive, driving up incomes and transforming the economy. Over time, the
demand for labour will increase, raising the share of wage employment and the level
of wages.
The role of agriculture is therefore complementary with the process of
industrialisation. For instance, industrial investment in processing will improve the
market for farmers. Similarly, increased agricultural incomes will increase the size of
the domestic market for manufactured consumer goods and services. For these
processes to occur, there needs to be an enabling environment for private business.
There is also a need for appropriate infrastructure and other public services. (MPFED
2004b)
Interviews indicate that public participation is taken seriously, but the basic
framework is not open to question (c.f., Nyamugasira and Rowden 2002). A lobbyist
argued that the PEAP process, and policy processes more generally, whilst apparently
open, are in fact quite restricted:
Uganda, the government, that's the central government, is much more open, you can
have an in, it's easy to walk in there. It's very easy to do good research, to say ‘please
include this’ or ‘this needs to be included otherwise poor people won't be
represented.’ Policy formulation has been opened up a long way. It's the policy
implementation that is the problem and the failure to really be able to challenge the
macroeconomic framework. That the government will not listen to. They'll shut
down. They will not respond….That is something they will not question; it is just not
something you raise. We are liberalizing and that is the way it is; we are privatizing
and that's a good thing. Poor people will need to pay for services in agriculture.
Other participants indicated that the government seeks to ensure that the PEAP is
consistent with other government policies and the agreed-upon division of labor
between public sector and private sector activities.
At the same time, the most recent PEAP revision process suggests participation is not
meaningless; advocacy efforts can have an impact. Several Ugandan civil society
organizations engaged in an organized lobbying effort to alter the way in which the
PEAP depicted pastoralists and addressed their issues. Pastoralism is a contentious
issue in Uganda, and “nomadism” has been condemned by influential politicians and
senior civil servants. The following statements by Minister of State for Animal
Industry, Mary Mugyeni, are representative:
In the livestock sector we continue to have nomads. Running around this country …
moving with their animals, spreading disease, living in very poor conditions…(Pro-poor
Livestock Policy Initiative Workshop, November 8, 2004)
So I know the problem with pastoralists…and we have to deal with them, very very
seriously. …I want to comment, to request that wherever these pastoralists, these
nomads, are, we give them a specific period of time and provide some funds,… give
you [pastoralists] a particular period of time until … you are allowed to be here until,
for not long maybe one year. Within it you must find somewhere to go. Buy your own
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land because you have livestock. We no longer have free land here. Buy your own
land, you have livestock…those who want the modern life can settle down. Those who
don’t want to be…, they will go and herd the animals of those who have modernized.
But something must be done. … People who don’t want change and modern life …
they eventually have to settle, no doubt about it (Ugandan Veterinary Association
Symposium, November 25, 2004).
In the view of organizations that work with pastoralists, the previous PEAP reflected
these perceptions by wrongly treating pastoralism as a source of insecurity and
seeking to solve pastoralists’ insufficient access to land and water through
sedentarization and provision of boreholes. These organizations view pastoralism as a
livelihood strategy that is often environmentally sustainable – and the best use of arid
lands – and could be economically profitable. Research indicates that, although the
average number of cattle per household is high among pastoralists, pastoralists fare
poorly by most measures of well-being (United Nations Development Program 2002).
Pastoral communities tend to have inferior access to animal health services, human
health services and education because services are oriented towards sedentary
communities.
Pastoralism-supportive organizations adopted a multifaceted approach to the
PEAP revision process. PANOS and Oxfam, which are international NGOs, took the
lead in this effort. With the Ugandan NGO Forum and several other member
organizations, they created a Civil Society Organizations Pastoral Task Force,
commissioned research from local scholars (Muhereza and Ossiya 2003, 2004),
cultivated relationships with staff in MFPED, and established a Pastoralism
Parliamentary Group.
These efforts received support from friendly donor
organizations, who funded educational efforts for policymakers. Task force members
participated in the PEAP revision process and submitted recommendations, backed by
research findings. Advocates made a strategic decision to engage with policymakers
on their terms, and to argue that pastoralism makes economic sense:
And so we started to think how can we make sure that pastoralists are included? Now
in the past people have made concerted efforts to [have] pastoralists included in the
PEAP but they've always come from [a] human rights perspective and they've always
been crushed. Because you know around the world human rights is a very contentious
issue to deal with and it's a very contentious issue because everybody asks you
…‘Whose rights in Uganda are not being abused? Why should pastoralists be
different?’ And those questions are very tough and very sobering questions... but they
brought us to ask more concrete questions ... and to look for a more suitable entry
point until we realized that actually the PEAP is not just a development document but
an economic document. It's about money and you have to show that any intervention
that you are taking or you are demanding for is going to make financial sense. So
you're correct to say political economy. And so that was the challenge for us, to show
that pastoralism makes economic sense. So we used two entry points: economics and
we used human rights…
Although the final version of the PEAP had not been published by the time this report
was written, the PEAP drafts in circulation describe pastoralism as a livelihood
strategy and identify pastoralists as a vulnerable population. As the PEAP provides the
framework for development policy, the discussion of pastoralism in the new PEAP
provides an entry point for civil society organizations to engage with the ministries
directly involved in livestock policy, service provision and other issues.
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Civil Society Views of Participatory Processes
Representatives of civil society organizations express a wide range of views about the
impact of their participation and its value relative to the time and staff energy it
consumes. Some argue that formal participatory processes are an improvement from
past exclusionary practices:
I think, we've moved a long way. There's a lot of opportunity for NGO's… But the
framework can never be fundamentally changed. But at the same time since the
space is there, maybe you keep on engaging, you keep on challenging. It's better than
it [is] not being there. If the alternative is that the government decides everything
and we sit down and we go ‘Okay, what can we do’ So I think that's how it works.
The idea of civil society engagement in policy is not very old. I would not want to lose
the opportunity to make comments. I think that you can achieve more by working
from the inside.
Others have become sceptical about the impact of participation:
This consultation process. They are consulting with local government functionaries,
not the grassroots. They're going to the subcounty and the districts. There is a
culture of seminars. These consultations are with administrative people not with the
grassroots. It is two thieves chasing one another. They know that the representatives
have not consulted the grassroots. The donors see this but they stay quiet. It is two
thieves doing funny things together. They don't want the voice of the real people but
the appearance.
In addition to the PEAP revision, CSOs participate in some sector working groups, the
gender donor group and the PMA Steering Committee. CSO participants have
sometimes found group norms silencing. Meetings often are dominated by donors and
government officials, who have greater technical expertise and familiarity with the
processes under review. Because most Ugandan NGOs are financially dependent on
foreign donors and government contracts, vocal disagreement in group meetings may
be difficult. Instead, organizations that are disappointed with consultative settings
have sometimes expressed disagreement through statements to the press. Other
group members then become upset that the organization has taken a disagreement
outside the group rather than addressing it within the group.
ActionAid, an international NGO active in Uganda, has published an analysis of
participation in the poverty reduction strategy process (ActionAid International
Uganda et al. 2004; also see Gariyo 2002). The authors argue that the processes are
donor-driven and silence debate about important national policy issues like monetary
policy, land reform and trade. ActionAid suggests that civil society organizations
consider creating other venues for broader policy discussion as a complement to, or
replacement for the government poverty reduction policy processes. The Ugandan
NGO Forum is conducting an evaluation of the impact of CSO participation in the PEAP
revision.
For most Ugandan civil society organizations, involvement in policy consultation and
advocacy is a new experience. Civil society organizations are now asked to share their
viewpoints and to serve as partners with government in research and service
provision. Organizations are often comfortable and experienced in service provision,
but policy processes require a new set of skills. In interviews, CSO staff and civil
servants agreed that civil society organizations need to develop greater technical
expertise to analyse, formulate and negotiate policies. Several Ugandan CSO
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associations, including the Uganda National NGO Forum and the Development Network
of Indigenous Voluntary Associations, are leading advocacy efforts or assisting member
organizations to build their capacity.
The new openness to societal participation is a dramatic shift for cooperative
associations and other farmers groups. These organizations were subject to strict
controls during the 1970s, and many ceased to function. The government is now
encouraging the revitalization of cooperatives. Although agricultural associations are
routinely invited to participate in government policy processes, there has been little
organized advocacy outside the dairy sector to date. However, the Agricultural
Council of Uganda is seeking to promote policy analysis and advocacy among
commodity associations. The Uganda Beef Producers Association, a fairly new
organization comprised primarily of large producers, is engaging with the government
on key issues.

Dairy Sector Reforms: Participation and Exclusion and Privatization
Processes
The dairy industry is the most organized livestock subsector in Uganda. There are
several dozen local producers associations or cooperatives, four district unions,
regional dairy associations and associations for traders, processors and breeders.51
Many of the cooperative organizations predate the Museveni regime, whilst the others
are relatively new. The largest charitable organizations that donate livestock, Heifer
Project International and Send A Cow, only work with groups. Additionally, a recent
USAID project has encouraged the formation of associations.52 Dairy organizations are
particularly strong in the south west, where milk is relatively abundant but prices are
low. Many producers in this area are obligated to sell their milk to the Dairy
Corporation because it owns local milk collection centers.
It might be expected that dairy sector participants would be well-positioned to
influence government decisions regarding the sector. Local dairy cooperatives have a
longer history than other livestock producers associations, some dairy cooperative
leaders have held political office, and the President comes from the dairy-oriented
south-west. However, dairy associations and private sector dairy companies have had
little influence on the privatization of the Dairy Corporation. Established in 1967 to
develop the dairy industry, the Dairy Corporation is the largest milk processor in
Uganda.53 More than 13,000 farmers sold milk to the Corporation in 2002 (Mwenda
2005). The Corporation has suffered from severe financial difficulties and the
government has often been called upon to subsidize its continued operation. Dairy
producers have also expressed dissatisfaction with the Corporation:
The Dairy Corporation isn't giving us good prices. If we had an alternative we wouldn't
sell to them. But the machines—the coolers and generators—that we are using belong
to the Dairy Corporation. We are using their equipment to put in our milk. We will be
coming to abandon these people. We will get away from them.
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Organizations include the Uganda National Dairy Farmers Association, Uganda National Dairy Traders Association, Ugandan
Dairy Processors Association, Ugandan Veterinary Management Association, Eastern Uganda Dairy Farmers & Breeders
Association, Northern Uganda Dairy Farmers & Breeders Association, Central Uganda Dairy Farmers & Breeders Association,
Western Uganda Dairy Farmers & Breeders Association, and the Ugandan National AI Technicians Association.
52

The US Agency for International Development jointly funded the giant Land O’Lakes cooperative, Heifer Project
International, and World-Wide Sires to promote the private dairy sector in Uganda, and a number of organizations were
started under the aegis of this project, which is coming to a close.
53
The functioning of the Corporation was severely impaired, and much of the infrastructure was destroyed during the Amin
regime and the civil conflicts that followed. In the late 1980s, the Corporation was rehabilitated, and much of the
infrastructure in south western Uganda was restored.
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Although farmers have not yet been able to sever the relationship with the Dairy
Corporation, they have withheld milk in response to unacceptable prices. This tactic
led to some improvements, demonstrating the potential power of collective action.
In Uganda, privatization is influenced by conflicting economic and political
imperatives. From an economic perspective, the Dairy Corporation has been a drain
on state resources and might well function better under private management.
Privatization is consistent with a liberal reform strategy of state withdrawal from
inappropriate attempt to take on private sector functions.
From a political
perspective, privatization is an opportunity to allocate favors; one can use the
divestment of state assets to reward allies or donors.54 It is clear that political
considerations have often trumped economic factors in the privatization of state
assets.
The government has established regulations to govern privatization;
privatization processes have been governed by a Divestiture Statue since 1993. The
government also has established a Privatization Unit, housed in MFPED, to manage the
divestment of parastatals. This unit evaluates the organizations to be divested and
issues requests for bids; it is supposed to divest each organization to a suitable bidder.
Despite this, state assets have been undervalued and granted to political loyalists in
several cases (Tangri and Mwenda 2001; Uganda Debt Network).55 In others, President
Museveni has unilaterally intervened to determine which company will be awarded
ownership, as is the case with the Dairy Corporation.
After the government decided to privatize the Dairy Corporation, dairy producers in
the Southwest, who sell much of their milk to the Corporation, sought to persuade the
government to divest the Corporation to dairy farmers, and, with support from the
Dairy Development Authority,56 the farmers formed a national association, the Uganda
National Dairy Farmers Association. However, it became clear that the government
would not give farmers a majority share. Instead, the privatization unit issued a call
for the prequalification of companies and consortiums. There were several responses
to this call, and four consortiums were pre-qualified in December 2003. At that point,
communication with the consortiums, dairy associations, and Divestiture Reform and
Implementation Committee stopped.
The Dairy Corporation is a mystery. Things have been going on for a long time and we
don't know what's going on (November 12, 2004 Interview).
In October 2004, a newspaper article revealed that the Cabinet had ordered the
suspension of the Corporation’s privatization, and its lease to a Thai company
(Nnanozi 2004). The rationale for postponing privatization was a proposed school milk
program. The announcements led to immediate speculation because the Thai
company, Malee Sampran Public Company Ltd., was experiencing serious financial
difficulties. Subsequent stories revealed that the president had ordered the lease for
a nominal fee of one dollar,57 and that the Thai company willingness to lease the
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Van de Walle (2001) argues that African political leaders have used privatization to reward and penalize key
individuals and groups. Lewis and Stein’s (1997) study of Nigerian financial sector privatization illustrates how political
actors can manipulate the process. When privatization is dominated by political considerations, it rarely produces the
desired economic benefits.
55

Cases include the privatization of Uganda Airlines Corp., Apollo Hotel Corp., Uganda Commercial Bank, Uganda
Consolidated Properties Ltd., and Uganda Grain Milling Corp. Ltd.
56
The Dairy Corporation was responsible for developing the dairy sector and regulating it as well as marketing milk for
several decades. In 1998, the Dairy Development Authority was created and granted responsibility for regulation and sector
development; the Dairy Corporation continued to collect, process, and market milk.

57

The Privatization Unit proposed to charge the company US $1 million plus rental fees and a proportion of profits (Mwenda
2005). Museveni argued that the low fee was necessary to persuade this “very serious and successful investor” to take on the
out-of-date factory and to develop food-processing potential (Museveni Defends 1 Dollar Dairy Corporation Deal 2005).
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Corporation was conditional on the grant of the school milk feeding program to itself
as a guarantee of demand.
Additionally, the Thai company was considering
subcontracting its lease obligations to one of the consortiums, and two Cabinet
ministers had established a front company, Pan African Foods Limited, to take the
lease on behalf of the Thai company. In late February 2004, the Parliamentary
Committee on Finance and Economic Development suspended the lease agreement
pending further consideration. Vice President Bukenya then issued a directive which
“expressly forbids Malee Sampran from using a Ugandan firm as the contracting lessee
and from sub-contracting its lease obligations to a third party” (Mukasa 2005). In
April, the Minister of State for Privatisation Peter Kasenene announced that the
government had decided not to lease the Dairy Corporation to Malee Sampran Public
Company Ltd but to hire managers from the company instead. Later that month, it
was announced that the corporation would be sold to Ugandan dairy farmers
(Karugaba 2005a). Since an executive at the Thai company accepted a management
contract in May, it is not clear who will control the company (Karugaba 2005b, c;
Nalugo 2005).
The privatization of the Dairy Corporation directly affected thousands of dairy
farmers, and granting the school milk program to Malee Sampran would have
negatively affected other milk processing companies.58 In 2003, there were 12 private
milk processing companies, most of which were operating at less than 30 percent of
capacity (Kasirye 2003); the school milk program was an attractive contract to many
domestic processors. Despite this, sector participants were excluded from this
process until the series of stories by the Monitor newspaper brought these processes
into the open and stirred Parliamentary action. In Uganda, presidential interventions
are frequent and difficult to challenge:
“Can't somebody else take care of this business, does it always have to be the
President? That is why I always say it's a one-man state…couldn't the Prime Minister or
Vice President do something or anybody else?”
In President Museveni, all Uganda's problems seem to find their final arbitration
(Gyezaho 2005).
Uganda’s reforms have created space for consultation and participation.
Parliamentary oversight of divestiture provides a venue in which affected parties can
plead their case; the dairy divestiture committee included the president of the
Bushenyi Dairy Industry Cooperative Union. Like other new government agencies and
parastatals, the Dairy Development Authority regards consultation as an integral part
of its work. However, the influence of these agencies, civil society organizations and
affected parties is limited when formal procedures are not followed. This case
illustrates the limits of participatory reforms in a semi-authoritarian context. Because
Uganda’s media is relatively free, garnering press coverage of irregular activities may
be one of the few tools available to those without high-level political contacts.

58
The United Nations World Food Program subsequently withdrew its tender for school milk provision because the
government’s demand that one supplier receive the tender violates UN requirements for open and fair bidding (WFP Pulls Out
of School Food Deal 2005).
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This section outlines several interventions that could improve the livelihoods of poor
rural livestock producers. The proposed interventions seek to reduce barriers to
producer benefit, such as high transaction costs, widespread disease and insufficient
information that reduce producers’ benefits and diminish their negotiating ability.
The proposed interventions work within the dominant neo-liberal market approach.
While this perspective seeks to constrain government intervention in markets,
governments are supposed to provide an enabling environment for the market and
ensure the provision of public goods. These services are necessary for markets to
fulfil their potential. Markets do not exist in isolation, and they cannot perform well
without support. Crucial services provided by the state include the provision of order
and a legal, administrative and regulatory infrastructure (Chaudhry 1993; Evans 1995).
Scholarship also has highlighted the importance of information and transaction
costs(Leonard 2000).59 The proposals suggest some ways in which intervention could
improve market functioning and enhance producer benefit.

Improving Livestock Sector Infrastructure
Although the government has prioritized road construction and rural electrification, it
has not devoted equal attention to sector-specific infrastructure. Weighing stations,
cattle dips and milk collection centers facilitate the operation of the livestock sector.
Weighing stations provide buyers (traders) and sellers (livestock producers) with
information that facilitate valuation of the products being sold. Cattle dips facilitate
disease prevention. Collection centers enable dairy farmers that produce only a small
amount of milk to sell their milk jointly. Collection centers also can reduce losses
from spilled milk.
These semi-public goods are unlikely to be provided sufficiently without intervention.60
Their cost is such that few small producers could afford individual purchase, and the
Ugandan livestock sector overwhelmingly comprises small producers. Most local
governments have tendered out the management of livestock markets and privatized
abattoirs and slaughter houses. Market managers and local governments could afford
to create a common infrastructure, but they do not benefit directly from their
existence. For them, sick animals or lower cattle prices are externalities; they do not
bear these costs. Other actors, such as livestock traders, may benefit from the
absence of infrastructure. Because livestock traders buy and sell animals on a regular
basis, they have access to price information and develop skill at assessing livestock.
Because small-scale producers sell their animals infrequently, they are less likely to
be able to assess the market value of their livestock in the absence of weighing
stations and standardized grading systems.
Government intervention to facilitate provision and maintenance of this sectoral
infrastructure would benefit poor producers, but direct government provision of this
infrastructure, as envisioned in the ADB Livestock Development Project, is not the
only possible approach. The government could also require livestock market managers
to provide weighing stations, or it could allocate space in which farmers groups could

59
The literature on new institutional economics has focused on these issues (See, for example, North 1990; Williamson 1975,
1999)
60
A pure public good exhibits nonexcludability and nonrivalry (one person’s use does not prevent another’s). These traits
create free rider problems; since those who bear the costs of provision cannot exclude others from benefit, there is little
incentive to invest. For semi-public goods, exclusion is difficult and/or subtraction (crowding) effects occur. Willingness to
pay for these goods depends on how the exclusion and rivalry problems are addressed, as well as on the private benefits
garnered by recipients of these goods. (Also see footnote 48.)
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place weighing stations, cattle dips and other collective infrastructure.61 There are
dairy cooperatives in Uganda and elsewhere that have established collection centers.62
Alternatively, government or nongovernmental organizations could subsidize the
purchase of infrastructure, facilitate negotiations with suppliers to provide
appropriate products and encourage standardisation of products.

Improving Incentives for Market Participation and Productivity
The mission of the PMA is “eradicating poverty by transforming subsistence agriculture
to commercial agriculture” (MAIIF and MPFED 2000). At present, however, poor
producers, traders and processors face a number of disincentives to investment in
commercial production. Rural producers lack good information about the prices their
goods may receive at markets, and they consequently make decisions about what to
market and how much to invest in their animals based on sparse and possibly
inacurate information. Although producer ignorance may benefit other sector
participants in some cases, in others it simply represents a loss to the sector as
livestock products are unsuited to higher value uses. While there have been
initiatives to provide crop information through the radio, there has been no systematic
dissemination of livestock price information for several years (ADF 2002).
Interventions to disseminate livestock market information broadly are clearly
warranted and could be undertaken by government, donors, or the private sector.
Because substantial capital and technical expertise in communications would be
required, this intervention is likely to be outside the capacity of producer groups.
Producers that sell their livestock encounter a prohibitive array of taxes and fees.
Selling a cow may require purchase of a movement permit and a movement letter,
and payment of a market tax and a slaughter tax (Bahiigwa et al. 2004; Ellis and
Bahiigwa 2003). Bahiigwa and co-authors (2004) argue that these fees are regressive;
“poor people with small quantities to sell pay relatively much higher dues than less
poor people with larger quantities to sell.” These fees are a disincentive to
participate in formal markets, and may undermine prospects for commercialization.
Their research also indicates that the revenues generated by these fees are not
sufficient to outweigh these costs (Bahiigwa et al. 2004; Bahiigwa, Rigby, and
Woodhouse 2005). Government intervention would be necessary to remove these
disincentives.
For processors and marketers, insufficient quality differentiation is a disincentive to
investment. It is more expensive to produce high-grade, hygienic products, and, at
present, there are limited markers for high-quality goods at the lower end of the
market.63 Without interventions to alter the incentive structure, the poor quality of
livestock products is likely to inhibit exports to foreign markets. Strategies to improve
the incentives could include greater government enforcement of existing standards
and private sector investment in branding to allow price differentiation. A grading
system for livestock products could assist producers, marketers and consumers to
make informed decisions about price and quality.

61

The literature on common pool resources suggests that collective provision and maintenance of this infrastructure by its
users may be superior to state or private management (See Ostrom 1990).
62
For example, the Kirinnya Women’s Cooperative Society has a small center in which it collects milk, packages it for sale,
and makes yogurt. While this infrastructure was largely built by the group, its members have benefited from livestock
donations and organizational capacity building from Heifer Project International.
63
UHT milk is sold in distinctive vacuum packs and commands a premium. However, this milk is too expensive for most
Ugandan consumers.
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Linking Information to Reform Assessments
The Uganda Government has implemented several initiatives to reduce poverty,
including the PEAP and the PMA. Agricultural and livestock interventions use a group
and enterprise-based approach. Given the scepticism about these interventions
among civil servants and civil society organizations, these programs are under
pressure to deliver results. In this context, there is a tendency to focus on the
outcomes that will be measured, for example, the number of farmer groups or subcounties served by NAADS (PMA 2004). In the rush to demonstrate success, there is a
risk that poor producers will lose out.64 Groups located in poor areas do not
necessarily benefit poor people, and mixed groups that include women and poor
people do not necessarily represent them (Isooba et al. 2003; Peterson 1982). Thus, it
is important to incorporate measurable indicators of the extent to which poor people,
pastoralists, women and other marginalized groups participate in programs and
benefit from them (Also see Bahiigwa, Rigby, and Woodhouse 2005:6, 11-12). Doing so
will encourage program implementers to focus on this area (c.f. Adam and Gunning
2002). This information also will assist poor people’s organizations and CSOs
advocating on behalf of the poor to monitor success and advocate change.65
Development partners that fund these initiatives could encourage the government to
incorporate disaggregated participation and outcome data into these programs. For
example, the Ugandan Bureau of Statistics could include relevant indicators in
household surveys or censuses.

Supporting Citizen and Civil Society Participation
For most of Uganda’s history, the government has sought to repress participation
rather than to encourage it. Most Ugandan civil society organizations have little
experience participating in policy development or engaging with local governments.
In this context, poor livestock producers are unlikely to take full advantage of existing
opportunities to participate, or to create new opportunities to participate. National
and international organizations that have some experience and participatory processes
or policy advocacy could contribute to poor people’s participation by building the
capacity of membership associations to participate in public policy. Support could
include sharing information about participatory processes – for example, describing
how the budget process or the non-sectoral conditional grants66 are supposed to work –
, supporting groups of poor producers, linking similar groups in different areas and
facilitating participation (See Houtzager and Kurtz 2000). For example, ActionAid
Uganda is supporting several regional networks that work on agriculture and food
security. The networks identify their policy priorities and decide what approach to
take. Because participation in politics is sometimes met with repression, individuals
and local group should retain control over their level of engagement and form of
participation. Local people are likely to have a better sense of implicit political
boundaries, and they will live with the consequences of their choices.
While none of these interventions would guarantee improved livelihoods, each of the
proposed interventions would increase livestock producers’ capacity to engage with
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As Bahiigwa and co-authors (2005) observe, there is disagreement on whether PMA should prioritize poverty reduction or
“modernization.” There is sufficient ambiguity in the PMA to provide implementers with flexibility. Spilsbury, Naggaga, and
Oyat (2003) argue that implementation to date has tended to favor the better off.

65
This intervention would build upon existing attempts to assess the impact of NAADS on poor producers (See Manyire and
Emmett 2004; MPFED 2002).

66

The non-sectoral conditional grants are transfers to local governments that may be used on any poverty reducing activity
that benefits the community as a whole and falls into a priority sector (separately funded sectors, including health and
education), are excluded. These funds could be used to support livestock sector interventions.
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the market and with the state. Small changes, such as provision of weighing stations,
could increase the extent to which poor producers benefit from their livestock and are
motivated to invest in them. The interventions discussed above would not alter the
fundamental political context of semi-authoritarian governance and enduring violent
conflict in much of the country. There are no simple strategies for resolving these
deeply rooted problems, and Ugandans will decide how to address them through their
individual and collective actions over the long-term.
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